Resilience Profile
Perfect Diary

Perfect Diary

Guangzhou, Guangdong 🇨🇳

When L'Oréal and Estée Lauder dominated China's $60B beauty market through TV ads, Huang Jinfeng built Perfect Diary with zero traditional spend. The "1990 strategy"—1% celebrities, 9% mid-tier, 90% micro-influencers—created trust networks that reached ¥100M in 13 minutes on Singles Day 2019.

Founded 2017: P&G insider Huang Jinfeng; zero traditional advertising from day one
Recognition First Chinese brand to break ¥100M single-day Tmall sales (2019)
Revenue ¥5.84B ($916M) peak in 2021; ¥3.39B ($465M) in 2024
Scale 15,000+ KOL partnerships; First Chinese beauty brand #1 on Tmall (2019)
Unique Edge "1990 strategy" (1% celebrities, 9% mid-tier, 90% micro) created trust networks faster than advertising

Perfect Diary (完美日记) rewrote the rules of beauty brand building in China—not through massive advertising budgets, but through systematic community-building that legacy giants couldn’t replicate. While L’Oréal (欧莱雅) and Estée Lauder (雅诗兰黛) spent billions on TV commercials and magazine spreads, founder Huang Jinfeng (黄锦峰) built trust networks through 15,000 Key Opinion Leader partnerships that reached consumers faster and more authentically than any advertising campaign could.

Transformation Arc

2017 Founded by Huang Jinfeng (黄锦峰) with zero traditional advertising strategy
Former P&G executive (2007-2010, CMK division) launches digital-native beauty brand targeting Chinese Gen Z. Contrarian bet: building trust networks through KOL partnerships rather than traditional advertising spend. Huang previously VP at Yunifang (御泥坊) after Harvard MBA.
Setup
2018 Austin Li (李佳琦) becomes key KOL partner, validating livestream commerce model
Austin Li (李佳琦, 'Lipstick King'), who famously sold 15,000 lipsticks in 5 minutes during a livestream competition with Alibaba (阿里巴巴) founder Jack Ma (马云), became one of Perfect Diary's most powerful KOL partners. Validated influencer-driven marketing model and livestream commerce viability for Chinese beauty brands.
Catalyst
2019-11 First Chinese brand to break ¥100M ($14M) single-day Tmall (天猫) sales (Double 11)
Reached ¥100M during first sales period, broke ¥200M two hours later. Top-selling makeup brand on Tmall (天猫) Singles Day 2019. Validated digital-first strategy could generate massive demand without traditional advertising. Demand driven by community engagement, not discounting.
Breakthrough
2019 Gen Z consumers rank Perfect Diary #2 favorite domestic brand after Huawei (华为)
Tmall (天猫) Gen Z consumer survey. Cultural acceptance milestone: Chinese consumers choosing domestic brands based on quality and relevance, not patriotic obligation. Founder quote: 'In 2019 when Tmall asked Gen Z about their favorite domestic brands, we came second to Huawei (华为).'
Triumph
2020-11 NYSE IPO at $4.46B valuation (ticker: YSG, Yatsen Holding)
November 19, 2020: Raised $617M at $10.50/ADS (top of range). First-day close $18.40 gave market cap of $7.82B. China's first publicly traded beauty brand, marking Chinese beauty industry's arrival on global stage.
Triumph
2021 Revenue peaks at ¥5.84 billion ($916.4M), 11.6% YoY growth
Peak revenue year for Yatsen Holding (Perfect Diary parent). Demonstrated scale achievement of digital-native Chinese beauty brand. Growth moderated from 2020's 72.6% surge as market matured.
Triumph
2022 Chinese beauty brands double market share from 14% (2017) to 28% among top color cosmetics brands
Ecosystem effect from Perfect Diary's IPO success. Multiple Chinese beauty startups raised significant capital: Florasis (花西子, $200M at $1.2B valuation), Colorkey, Judydoll, INTO YOU. Domestic players like Perfect Diary, Florasis (花西子), and Proya (珀莱雅) successfully competing against international giants on innovation and digital sophistication rather than just price.
Triumph
2022 Post-IPO valuation corrections reflect growth sustainability concerns
Market adjustments as investors question unit economics and rising customer acquisition costs. Reality check: viral growth strategies face scrutiny when capital markets demand profitability. Marks transition from hypergrowth to sustainable operations focus.
Crisis
2023 Revenue declines to ¥3.41B ($481M), focus shifts to profitability
7.9% revenue decline from 2022. Non-GAAP net loss improved 34.6% to ¥296.1M. Market maturity and increased competition impact growth. Company prioritizes sustainable unit economics over hypergrowth.
Struggle
2024 Q4 first non-GAAP quarterly profit since crisis
¥107M profit signals potential turnaround. Skincare reaches 43.5% of revenue (up from zero in 2019). Gross margin hits record 79.1%. Strategic pivot from color cosmetics to skincare portfolio (Galénic, Eve Lom, DR.WU) shows results.
Triumph

The strategy emerged from a simple observation that sophisticated investors initially dismissed: China’s $60 billion beauty market had already shifted from offline to online. Department store counters and glossy magazine advertisements—the playbook that built Western beauty empires over a century—meant nothing to consumers who discovered products through Xiaohongshu (小红书) reviews and made purchasing decisions during Douyin (抖音) livestreams. The multinationals saw this shift coming; Perfect Diary understood it had already happened.

The P&G Insight

Huang’s three years at Procter & Gamble’s CMK (Consumer and Market Knowledge) department provided the analytical framework that would later power Perfect Diary’s disruption. He became P&G’s youngest marketing manager in China, mastering what he called the three pillars of consumer insight: hindsight (understanding what happened), insight (understanding why it happened), and foresight (predicting what will happen).

But the role also revealed something the multinational couldn’t see. L’Oréal, Estée Lauder, and Shiseido had dominated China’s beauty market through the same strategies that worked in New York, Paris, and Tokyo: department store distribution, television advertising, magazine campaigns, celebrity endorsements. These legacy advantages had become liabilities. The infrastructure that took decades to build now anchored them to a world that Chinese consumers had already left behind.

After P&G, Huang pursued an MBA at Harvard Business School. During a 2011 summer break, he noticed Weibo’s meteoric rise—China’s Twitter equivalent was fundamentally changing how consumers discovered and discussed products. The observation crystallized into a thesis: whoever mastered platform-native engagement would leapfrog the century of brand equity that Western giants had accumulated.

The 1990 KOL Strategy

The name “1990” captured the mathematical precision: 1% celebrity partnerships for reach, 9% mid-tier influencers for credibility, 90% micro-influencers for authentic community engagement. This wasn’t influencer marketing as Western brands understood it—it was building trust networks faster than traditional advertising could build brand awareness.

The strategy inverted traditional marketing logic. Western brands hired celebrities to associate their products with aspiration and status. Perfect Diary hired 15,000 ordinary beauty enthusiasts to share genuine experiences with products they actually used. The difference was authenticity at scale—not manufactured endorsements, but real recommendations from people consumers trusted.

Perfect Diary’s 2017 launch strategy would have seemed insane to traditional beauty executives: zero traditional advertising spend. No magazine spreads. No television commercials. No celebrity endorsement contracts. Instead, Huang built relationships with thousands of Key Opinion Leaders—not paid sponsorships where influencers read scripts, but authentic partnerships where beauty enthusiasts genuinely tested and recommended products.

The execution required operational sophistication that competitors couldn’t easily replicate. Perfect Diary’s team managed relationships with thousands of influencers simultaneously, tracking engagement rates, optimizing content timing, and adjusting strategy in real-time based on platform algorithm changes. This wasn’t marketing in the traditional sense—it was building a distributed sales force of authentic advocates who happened to reach millions of potential customers.

Platform-Specific Content Mastery

What worked on Douyin (抖音) wasn’t repurposed for Xiaohongshu (小红书)—it was reimagined from scratch to maximize each platform’s unique engagement patterns. This granular understanding of digital consumer behavior became a moat that international brands couldn’t easily cross.

Xiaohongshu users wanted detailed product reviews, ingredient breakdowns, and before-and-after comparisons. Douyin users wanted entertainment—15-second transformations, dramatic reveals, and personalities they could follow. Weibo users wanted trending topics and viral moments. Perfect Diary created distinct content strategies for each platform, recognizing that the same product required completely different storytelling depending on where consumers encountered it.

The company also mastered Tmall’s (天猫) recommendation algorithms, understanding that product discovery on China’s dominant e-commerce platform followed patterns that Western marketing couldn’t decode. Search optimization, review management, and promotional timing became sciences refined through millions of data points.

When Austin Li (李佳琦, China’s “Lipstick King”) sold 15,000 lipsticks in five minutes during a livestream competition with Alibaba (阿里巴巴) founder Jack Ma (马云), it validated Huang’s contrarian bet. The partnership with Austin Li became a template: leverage the trust that influencers had already built rather than trying to manufacture it through expensive advertising campaigns.

The breakthrough came during 2019’s Double 11 when Perfect Diary became the first Chinese brand to break ¥100 million ($14M) in Tmall (天猫) sales in a single day—reaching that milestone in just 13 minutes. Not through discounting, but through demand generated entirely by digital community engagement. By the end of the day, Perfect Diary had surpassed ¥200 million.

The Guangzhou Advantage

Perfect Diary’s hometown provided an operational advantage that observers often overlooked. Guangzhou sits at the center of China’s OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturing) cluster for cosmetics—the same factories that produce products for L’Oréal, MAC, and Estée Lauder. Companies like Cosmax, Intercos, and Cosmo Beauty offered world-class manufacturing capabilities that any brand could access.

This meant Perfect Diary didn’t need to build its own factories or develop proprietary formulations from scratch. It could focus resources on what actually differentiated digital-native brands: customer relationships, content creation, and platform mastery. The manufacturing playing field was level; the marketing playing field was where Perfect Diary could win.

The company also invested heavily in R&D, eventually committing ¥5.8 billion to product development. But the early strategy recognized that quality parity with international brands was achievable through the OEM ecosystem—the real competitive advantage lay in reaching consumers through channels the legacy giants couldn’t master.

The Playbook That Changed an Industry

Perfect Diary’s success demonstrated that platform-native community building could outpace traditional advertising when targeting digital-native consumers. The company became the first C-Beauty (Chinese beauty) brand to rank #1 in Tmall’s cosmetics category during 2019’s Singles Day, defeating MAC, Estée Lauder, and L’Oréal.

The victory wasn’t a fluke. Perfect Diary had built something the international giants couldn’t replicate quickly: relationships with millions of consumers who trusted recommendations from influencers they followed, not advertisements they ignored. The 15,000 KOL partnerships represented a distribution network that traditional sales forces couldn’t match and advertising budgets couldn’t buy.

The ripple effects transformed China’s beauty landscape. Chinese beauty brands’ domestic market share climbed from 22% in 2017 to 42% by 2021, reaching 56% by 2023. Multiple Chinese beauty startups raised significant capital following Perfect Diary’s blueprint: Florasis (花西子, $200M at $1.2B valuation), Colorkey, Judydoll, INTO YOU—all competing on innovation and digital sophistication rather than just price.

Perfect Diary’s November 2020 NYSE IPO (ticker: YSG) at a $7.82 billion first-day market cap validated the model. The company raised $617 million, proving that investors saw the KOL strategy as more than a marketing tactic—it was a new paradigm for brand building in the digital age.

By February 2021, the stock peaked at $122.75 per share, giving the company a market capitalization of $16 billion. The 80 investors who had rejected Huang’s thesis watched as Perfect Diary’s success proved the patterns had indeed changed—consumers had moved, but the data hadn’t caught up.

The Reality Check

But the market was about to deliver a lesson that would prove as instructive as the original success: building fast is not the same as building strong.

By April 2022, Yatsen received a NYSE delisting warning. The stock had fallen to $0.39—a 98.5% decline from its peak. The traffic arbitrage strategy that had built the brand so quickly was now working against it: competitors had copied the KOL playbook while holding the century-old brand equity that Perfect Diary lacked.

The crisis forced a reckoning. Perfect Diary had mastered reach, not trust. The 15,000 KOL partnerships could generate awareness, but they couldn’t create the loyalty that sustains brands through difficult periods. International giants like L’Oréal had spent decades building brand equity; Perfect Diary had tried to shortcut that process through growth hacking.

Huang declared what he called a “second entrepreneurship”—a fundamental pivot from the strategy that had built Perfect Diary. The company shifted focus from color cosmetics to skincare, acquiring premium brands like French Galénic, British Eve Lom, and Taiwanese DR.WU. These weren’t growth hacking plays; they were bets on brand equity that would take years to develop.

By Q4 2024, the pivot showed results. Yatsen posted its first non-GAAP quarterly profit since the crisis: ¥107 million. Skincare had grown to 43.5% of revenue (up from zero in 2019). Gross margins reached a record 79.1%. The company wasn’t recovering through the same strategies that built it—it was building something fundamentally different.

The $15.6 billion in lost market capitalization represents perhaps the single most expensive lesson in modern beauty industry history. But the lesson itself has value: traffic arbitrage can accelerate reach, but only brand equity protects margins when competitors learn your playbook. The 1990 strategy created something remarkable—but sustainable brands require more than rapid customer acquisition. They require trust that takes time to build.

The Lesson for Global South Brands

When Gen Z consumers told Tmall (天猫) in 2019 that Perfect Diary was their second-favorite domestic brand after Huawei (华为), it validated something profound: Chinese consumers were choosing domestic brands based on quality and cultural relevance, not national pride or patriotic obligation. The “1990 strategy” had created something traditional advertising never could—authentic trust networks that converted followers into customers and customers into advocates.

The playbook Perfect Diary pioneered has implications beyond China’s beauty market. Any market where legacy brands built advantages through traditional media faces similar disruption potential. The question isn’t whether consumers prefer old or new brands—it’s whether new brands can reach consumers through channels where legacy advantages don’t apply.

Perfect Diary proved that emerging market brands don’t need to outspend global giants. They need to outmaneuver them—building relationships through platforms the giants don’t understand, with influencers the giants can’t recruit, using strategies the giants’ organizational structures can’t execute. The 1990 strategy wasn’t just a marketing innovation. It was proof that the rules of brand building had fundamentally changed.

The story continues to evolve. Perfect Diary’s remarkable journey from zero traditional advertising to NYSE listing to near-collapse to emerging recovery offers a more complete narrative than simple success stories can provide. The lesson isn’t just about disruption—it’s about what comes after disruption succeeds. Building fast creates opportunity; building strong creates long-term durability. The brands that successfully master both will define the next era of global beauty competition.

For investors, partners, and strategic observers watching emerging market brands, Perfect Diary provides both a template and a critical warning. The template: platform-native strategies can overcome legacy advantages when executed with operational precision. The warning: customer acquisition is not customer loyalty. Traffic arbitrage creates reach, not moats. The companies that understand this distinction—and build accordingly—will be the ones that survive the inevitable moment when competitors learn their playbook.

Locations (4)

© CARTO · OSM

Market Presence (7)

Home market
Active markets

Brand Snapshot

Scale

  • Revenue: ¥5.84B ($916M) in 2021
  • Distribution: Multi-platform presence (Tmall, JD, Weibo, Xiaohongshu, Douyin)

Market Position

  • Position: China's first publicly traded beauty brand, Gen Z #2 favorite domestic brand after Huawei (2019)
  • Differentiation: KOL-driven digital marketing + zero traditional advertising + first Chinese beauty IPO

Recognition

  • Awards:
    • Top-selling makeup brand Tmall Singles Day 2019

Business Model

  • Type: Digital-native D2C evolved to omnichannel + portfolio holding (Yatsen)
  • Channels: Multi-platform presence (Tmall, JD, Weibo, Xiaohongshu, Douyin) + Own website + major marketplaces + strategic offline retail

Strategic Context

  • Current Focus: Balancing expansion with operational excellence and unit economics

Cosmetics Details

  • Positioning: Premium-accessible